The Geneva Talks: An Opportunity for a Renewed Approach to Peace in Sudan

12 August 2024

The Geneva peace talks scheduled to commence on August 14 are an opportunity to critically reflect, recalibrate, and build upon the successes and failures of the Jeddah and Manama peace negotiations. This paper lays out key considerations for these latest talks.

Changed Conflict Dynamics

The co-convenors of the talks, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Switzerland must recognize that Sudan’s conflict landscape is radically different from the previous process. The humanitarian situation has significantly deteriorated with famine officially declared in Zamzam IDP camp in Darfur and feared in many other areas of the country. SAF continues to block humanitarian access via the Adre border crossing despite the flooding of the Tine crossing. The RSF’s advance poses a significant and sustained threat to domestic agricultural production.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have made sweeping advances across the country capturing Gezira and Sennar states. In July, this new wave of violence displaced over 725,000 people from Sennar State. The RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have both launched a new wave of attacks ahead of the start of the talks. Renewed fighting in Khartoum comes after months of relative calm. SAF launched airstrikes across many areas of North Darfur and even conducted airstrikes in South Sudan, whilst the RSF renewed their attacks on El Fasher and also attacked Blue Nile and Gedaref states. The co-convenors must not allow the RSF, SAF, or their respective allies to use the talks as cover to launch attacks against civilians and must be prepared to take coercive measures in the likely event that they do.

Key Considerations for International Stakeholders

Trust Building Measures
The RSF and SAF spokespersons should issue a joint statement each day of the talks that provides a broad overview of discussions. This would serve multiple purposes: keeping the Sudanese public informed and engaged as stakeholders in these discussions; tackling hate speech and disinformation; and building trust and cooperation between the belligerents. SAF and the RSF are fighting this war through an online campaign of hate speech and disinformation which has led to a breakdown in trust not only between them but also amongst the people of Sudan. As co-conveners, the United States, Switzerland, and Saudi Arabia need to engage the Sudanese population as stakeholders in these talks.

Sanctions
International stakeholders, including the UN, African Union, U.S. and Gulf States, should prepare a multilateral set of coordinated sanctions designations. Sanctions must include humanitarian exemptions, such as those already adopted by via the UN Security Council resolution 2664 and implemented in the United States through general licenses and be accompanied by a coordinated implementation and enforcement strategy that includes global financial institutions, and regional, and international actors.

These should target the highest levels of RSF and SAF leadership and the political economy that supports the continuation of this war such as the illegal export of Sudanese gold. International stakeholders must be prepared to impose these sanctions on those with the greatest command responsibility for the most serious and systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law including the continued use of starvation as a weapon of warfare, the ethnic targeting of civilians, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. The designations should come with clear and direct messaging to the parties, the Sudanese people, and broader international community on these issues. 

Sanctions are long overdue for the systemic denial of humanitarian aid and should be considered if SAF fails to reopen the Adre border crossing to humanitarian shipments, and if the RSF does not provide the necessary security guarantees for UN agencies and INGOs to expand their operations to further states in Sudan. Sanctions should also be considered if agreements are not implemented by belligerents, particularly concerning the blocking of aid.

The Humanitarian Crisis
Negotiating cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access is a priority. However, international donors should also directly support the localized humanitarian response within Sudan, including mutual aid and diaspora initiatives, and the emergency response rooms. International humanitarian access is vital in alleviating the human suffering in Sudan, emergency food relief can never fully address the current food insecurity crisis. The only way out of the famine is by increasing Sudan’s domestic agricultural production which can be internationally supported through projects like the Sudan Emergency Wheat Production Project which increased wheat production by 70% across five of Sudan’s states. Belligerents must end any activities that jeopardize Sudan’s agricultural production.

Ceasefire Guarantees
Any ceasefire agreement must be accompanied by an independent monitoring mechanism. Stakeholders should consider how the expertise and experience of Sudanese civil society could be used to support ceasefire monitoring. The RSF and SAF must also ensure that their allies uphold any ceasefire or humanitarian access agreement that is reached in Geneva. Since the last internationally brokered talks, there has been a proliferation of armed actors in the Sudan war. This means that any ceasefire or humanitarian access agreement between SAF and the RSF must also be translated to their allies on the ground. As SAF and the RSF mobilized these groups to achieve their military aims, they must both show leadership in ensuring that allied forces also uphold any agreements.

Sudan’s Future
The future of Sudan must be in the hands of Sudan’s civilians and not be determined by the RSF or SAF. The focus of the belligerents must be on ending the conflict. Neither the RSF nor SAF can be included in negotiations on the political future of Sudan. Convenors and observers of the talks must not sacrifice a durable peace for the sake of expediency. To do so could risk a rapid resurgence of violence. Though some may view a power-sharing agreement between the RSF and SAF as a potential solution to the conflict, this would inevitably lead to a resurgence of violence in Sudan within a short time frame as both parties have repeatedly shown their unwillingness to allow a civilian government in Sudan.

For further information, contact Shayna Lewis, Senior Advisor, and Sudan Specialist at slewis@paema.ngo